Every prior paper in this series documented participation whose misclassification produced a consequence the market could measure: advertising revenue captured without recognition of its origin, behavioral profiles sold to third parties, biological assets transferred in bankruptcy proceedings, insurance premiums raised by data the driver generated. The market priced those consequences because they were transactions. Paper Nine documents a domain where the worst consequence is not a transaction. It cannot be priced because it does not occur inside the market. It occurs when the data leaves the market entirely and reaches systems that do not operate on commercial logic.
The participation documented in this paper is intimate participation: the expression of desire, sexuality, relationship intent, reproductive state, and identity in contexts the participant understood to be private, bounded, and protected by the social norms governing intimate life. The system that captures that participation does not share those understandings. It captures identity, location, and intimate behavior as data, and data flows. It flows to advertisers through mobile advertising SDKs embedded in platform code. It flows to data brokers through those same SDKs, where it is aggregated with location signals, device identifiers, and behavioral patterns assembled from other platforms until the combination resolves pseudonymous records into identifiable individuals. It flows from data brokers to insurers, employers, and in documented cases to parties operating outside any commercial framework at all.
This is the first domain in the series where the system can act against the participant without any intermediary transaction. No sale of the participant's data is required. No pricing decision is required. No platform action directed at the participant is required. The data exists, the pipe flows, and the exposure happens. The participant who generated the data may never know it occurred. In jurisdictions where the identity disclosed through intimate platform participation carries legal consequences, the exposure is not a commercial harm. It is a condition of danger. This paper opens with that condition because it defines the domain. The monetization follows. The exposure comes first.
The intimate participation domain assembles data across four categories, each with distinct commercial destinations and distinct consequence profiles. They connect through the same data infrastructure.
Identity and orientation signals are the foundational category. The act of creating a profile on a platform oriented toward a specific sexual or relational identity is itself a disclosure. A person who creates a Grindr profile has disclosed their sexual orientation to that platform. A person who creates a profile on a transgender dating platform has disclosed their gender identity. These are not behavioral signals inferred from browsing patterns or purchase history. They are explicit identity disclosures made in a context the participant understood to be private. That context is not the context in which the data subsequently operates. The platform receives an explicit identity disclosure. The advertising SDK embedded in the platform's code receives a device identifier associated with that disclosure. The data broker that aggregates records from that SDK receives a signal that connects a specific device to a specific intimate identity platform. The re-identification that follows does not require the platform to disclose the participant's name. It requires only that the device identifier be matched to other datasets that carry the name. That match is commercially available.
Location data is the category that transforms identity disclosure into physical exposure. Dating and intimate platforms capture precise GPS coordinates continuously, enabling the construction of movement patterns that reveal home address, workplace, regular social locations, and the identity of other participants encountered in proximity. A single location signal is ambiguous. A pattern accumulated over days and weeks is not. Exposure compounds into certainty over time. A person whose device has been associated with a specific intimate identity platform and whose location data has been aggregated across months of use is not a pseudonymous user in any commercially meaningful sense. They are an identified individual whose intimate identity, physical location, and daily movement pattern are simultaneously available to any party with access to the data broker layer.
Relationship intent and behavioral signals constitute the commercial core of the domain. Swipe patterns, message content and frequency, response timing, profile engagement duration, match behavior, and subscription tier selection generate a detailed record of relational psychology and intimate preference whose commercial value extends into advertising targeting, behavioral modeling, and in some cases employment and insurance screening through the data broker layer that connects intimate platform participation to broader commercial systems.
Reproductive and health signals are the category where this domain intersects most acutely with Paper Eight. Fertility platform participation, pregnancy status, sexual health disclosures made within platform messaging systems, and HIV status information disclosed on platforms that request it for matching purposes generate biological signals whose legal and commercial exposure spans both domains. The intersection is documented separately in Section Six.
Grindr is a location-based platform serving gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer communities, with approximately 13 million monthly active users globally. Its function is social and intimate connection. Its data architecture is a mapping system of vulnerable identities in physical space.
In 2018, researchers at the Norwegian organization SINTEF documented that Grindr was transmitting user data to third-party advertising and analytics companies including Apptimize and Localytics. The transmitted data included HIV status, precise GPS location, relationship status, and device identifiers in a form that could be linked to individual user profiles. The transmission occurred through advertising SDKs embedded in the Grindr application, the standard mechanism through which mobile platforms integrate with the mobile advertising ecosystem. The SDK does not distinguish between the sensitivity of the data it encounters and the data it transmits. It transmits what is present. What was present in Grindr included health status and precise location associated with explicit identity disclosures.
In 2020, the Norwegian Consumer Council published a report titled Out of Control, documenting that Grindr and other applications were sharing user data with a network of advertising technology companies in ways that violated users' reasonable expectations and, the report argued, applicable privacy law. The report identified specific data flows from intimate platform participation to the broader advertising technology ecosystem, tracing the movement of intimate identity signals through the mobile ad exchange layer into data broker aggregation systems.
In 2021, the Norwegian Data Protection Authority issued a determination that Grindr had shared personal data including sexual orientation with advertising partners without a valid legal basis under the General Data Protection Regulation, which classifies sexual orientation as special category data requiring explicit consent for processing. The authority issued a fine of approximately 65 million Norwegian krone, subsequently reduced to 6.5 million Norwegian krone following appeal proceedings. The regulatory action established on the official record that intimate identity data had flowed from the platform to commercial third parties without the legal authorization the participants whose identity it represented had a right to expect.
In 2019 and 2020, the United States Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ordered the Chinese company Beijing Kunlun Tech to divest its ownership stake in Grindr. The CFIUS determination cited national security concerns: a foreign government with access to Grindr's data would possess a database of intimate identity, precise location, and behavioral patterns for a population that includes United States government employees and military personnel. The divestiture order established on the official government record that Grindr's user data constitutes a national security asset. A platform whose data is classified as a national security concern is not operating on the same risk register as a streaming service or a retail media network.
The data flows documented in this section moved from the platform through advertising SDKs to mobile ad exchanges to data broker aggregation systems where pseudonymous records were combined with location signals and device identifiers until they resolved into identifiable individuals. That is the pipe. The system produces exposure regardless of what any individual platform intended. The SINTEF documentation, the Norwegian Consumer Council report, the NDPA determination, and the CFIUS order each addressed a different dimension of the same architecture. Together they establish that intimate identity data does not remain within the platform that collected it, that the mechanism of movement is the standard mobile advertising infrastructure, and that the destinations include commercial actors, regulatory actors, and in the CFIUS determination, national security actors. In jurisdictions where homosexuality is criminalized, the destination of that data flow is not a commercial question. It is a legal and physical one. Location data from a platform serving LGBTQ+ participants in those jurisdictions is not a commercial asset. It is evidence. The person who generated it by seeking community or connection had no recognized standing in the arrangement that made their identity and location available to parties operating in legal systems that treat that identity as a crime.
After the exposure architecture is established, the commercial layer of this domain follows the series method. Match Group, Inc. operates Tinder, Hinge, OkCupid, Match, Plenty of Fish, and several other platforms serving hundreds of millions of users globally. Match Group reported total revenues of approximately $3.49 billion for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, against a global user base whose precise active user count is not consistently disclosed at the level of granularity the series has used for prior platforms.
The commercial architecture follows the dual transaction structure documented across the series. Users pay for premium subscription features including enhanced visibility, expanded swipe allowances, and profile boost functions. The free tier generates advertising revenue. Both tiers generate behavioral records of relational psychology: swipe patterns that map physical preferences, message content and frequency that reveal relational intent and communication style, location data that maps the physical environments in which participants seek connection, and engagement patterns that reflect emotional availability and attachment behavior. These behavioral records constitute a commercial asset whose value to advertisers and data brokers extends beyond the subscription and advertising revenue Match Group's financial disclosures capture.
The behavioral signals generated through dating platform participation are among the most commercially precise available in the consumer data market. A person searching for a romantic partner is expressing intent, preference, location, and emotional state simultaneously and continuously. That combination of signals is more commercially valuable than search intent, viewing behavior, or purchase history considered separately, because it combines all of those dimensions in a context of heightened emotional engagement. The platform that holds that record holds a behavioral model of intimate psychology that no other participation domain in the series produces.
Adult content platforms introduce a participation structure not present in any prior paper in the series. On adult content platforms, the content itself is the participation record. A person who creates and distributes intimate content through a platform has not generated behavioral data about themselves. They have generated content that is themselves, in a form that is permanent, portable, reproducible, and separable from the platform that hosted it.
OnlyFans reported over 220 million registered users and approximately $6.6 billion in gross merchandise value for the fiscal year ended November 2023, with the platform retaining 20% of creator earnings as its fee. The participation structure here differs from every prior paper in the series. The creator is simultaneously the subject of the content, the generator of the participation record, and in the OnlyFans model, a recognized economic contributor in the sense that the platform pays creators directly. That recognition is partial: it addresses the transaction between creator and platform for content distribution. It does not address the participation record the content constitutes once it has been distributed, downloaded, or copied by any of the platform's 220 million registered users.
The permanence problem is distinct from the asset persistence documented in Paper Eight. Genetic data persists as a dataset held by a corporate entity subject to legal process, regulatory oversight, and in theory deletion obligations. Intimate content persists as content: reproducible by any person who downloaded it, distributable through any channel that carries media files, and identifiable in a way that no behavioral or biological dataset is. The platform that hosted it may be subject to takedown obligations under the federal STOP CSAM Act and state non-consensual intimate image laws. The content that left the platform before those obligations existed, or that was copied and redistributed through channels outside the platform's control, is not recoverable by any legal mechanism currently available to the person who generated it. The participant who contributed that content to the platform has no recognized standing in any system that subsequently holds it.
This domain intersects with the biological participation domain documented in Paper Eight at two specific points that are sufficiently acute to warrant explicit identification rather than footnote treatment.
The first intersection is reproductive health data. Fertility platforms, pregnancy tracking applications, and sexual health disclosures made within intimate platform messaging systems generate biological signals whose legal exposure in post-Dobbs jurisdictions was documented in Paper Eight and applies with equal and compounding force in this domain. A person who discloses pregnancy status in a dating application message, fertility intent on a relationship platform, or sexual health information on an intimate platform whose messaging system retains that disclosure has contributed reproductive biological data to a system governed by intimate platform terms of service rather than health data regulation. The exposure risk is identical to that documented in Paper Eight. The regulatory protection is even more limited.
The second intersection is HIV status as a simultaneously biological and intimate disclosure. HIV status disclosed on a dating platform for matching purposes is not a behavioral signal. It is a health status disclosure whose commercial and legal exposure spans both domains. The SINTEF documentation of Grindr's transmission of HIV status data to advertising technology companies represents the most acute available example of biological health data moving through the intimate participation infrastructure to commercial third parties. The person whose HIV status was transmitted through that data flow did not disclose it as a commercial asset. They disclosed it as a condition of participation in a community. The platform transmitted it as a data field. The distinction between those two understandings of the same disclosure is the misclassification this series documents at its most personal.
The Introduction to this series established four conditions whose simultaneous presence is required for participation to function as voluntary exchange: survivable refusal, recognized standing, transparency of terms, and independent jurisdiction. Paper Nine applies those conditions to a domain where they fail through a mechanism no prior paper has documented: visibility rather than dependency, and non-revocability rather than persistence.
Survivable refusal fails in this domain through visibility. In prior papers, survivable refusal failed because the participant could not afford to leave the platform economically or socially, because participation was compelled by institutional mandate, or because the hardware had already activated the participation record before the person knew it existed. In this domain, survivable refusal fails because the act of participation is itself an identity disclosure that cannot be retracted. A person who creates a profile on a platform associated with a specific sexual or relational identity in a jurisdiction where that identity carries legal consequences has disclosed their identity to a system they cannot un-enter. Their decision to delete the profile does not retract the disclosure already transmitted through the advertising SDK layer to the data broker ecosystem. The window does not simply close. It closes on data that has already moved.
The non-revocability of intimate identity disclosure is distinct from the non-regenerability of genetic data established in Paper Eight. Paper Eight documented that biological data cannot be ungenerated once the sample has been processed. Paper Nine establishes a different constraint: intimate identity cannot be undisclosed once it has been exposed through the data infrastructure that connects platform participation to the commercial and non-commercial systems that receive it. The data did not need to remain with the platform for the exposure to have occurred. It needed only to have passed through the platform's data infrastructure once.
Recognized standing fails in this domain with consequences that extend outside the commercial register. In prior papers, the absence of recognized standing meant that the participant had no claim on the value their participation generated. In this domain, the absence of recognized standing means that the participant has no mechanism to control the exposure of their identity in systems that can produce that identity to parties operating in legal environments where that identity is a liability. The platform is not context-aware. The consequences are context-dependent. The same data that constitutes a commercial asset in one jurisdiction constitutes evidence of criminal conduct in another. The participant has no standing in either system.
Transparency of terms fails most completely for the populations whose participation carries the highest risk. A person who creates an intimate platform profile in a jurisdiction where their identity is criminalized is not in a position to evaluate the risk of data flows from that platform to advertising technology systems, data brokers, and parties operating in the legal environment they inhabit. The terms of service that govern those flows are written in language that satisfies disclosure requirements in the jurisdiction where the platform is incorporated. They were not written for and do not function as meaningful disclosure for a participant whose exposure risk is physical and legal rather than commercial.
Independent jurisdiction is formally present and substantively inadequate. The regulatory actions documented in Section Three — the NDPA fine, the CFIUS divestiture order, and the FTC investigations — address specific documented violations in specific legal frameworks. None establish the participant as a recognized origin of the intimate identity data whose exposure the violations produced. They address the conduct of the platform. They do not address the standing of the person whose identity was exposed by that conduct.
The Personal Data Royalty formula has been applied across every prior paper in the series to produce a per-user participation value baseline from disclosed financial data. In this domain, the formula carries the series method as far as the evidence permits, and then encounters a boundary condition that no prior paper has reached.
In the Origin Economics framework, Y = λ · f(H, K, T) expresses output as a function of human-origin participation, capital, and technology, multiplied by whether the legitimacy conditions of the exchange were satisfied. Lambda fails at the moment of identity disclosure. The person who creates an intimate platform profile has disclosed their identity to a system whose data flows extend beyond the platform before the profile is complete.
For Match Group, the formula applies using the series method. Match Group's approximately $3.49 billion in fiscal year 2024 revenue, divided across the platform's active user base, produces a per-user revenue figure that represents the subscription and advertising transaction only. The behavioral record of intimate psychology and relational intent that each user generates alongside that transaction is not captured in the disclosed revenue figure. The gap between the disclosed revenue baseline and the total commercial value of intimate behavioral participation is established as present and unaccounted for, consistent with the approach used in prior papers.
For Grindr, the formula encounters its boundary condition. The value of Grindr's participation data was established not through advertising revenue or subscription fees but through the NDPA regulatory fine and the CFIUS national security determination. These are not commercial valuations. They are regulatory and governmental assessments of the consequences of data exposure. The NDPA fine quantified a legal violation. The CFIUS order quantified a national security risk. Neither produces a per-user participation value figure in the sense the formula uses. They establish that the data has consequences sufficiently significant to trigger regulatory sanction and national security intervention. They do not produce a number that belongs in the ledger alongside the Google, Netflix, and Spotify figures from earlier papers.
This is the boundary condition. The PDR formula is designed to measure participation value that flows through commercial systems and can be captured in financial disclosures. In this domain, the most consequential flows do not pass through commercial systems. They pass through legal systems, security systems, and in the most acute cases, criminal justice systems in jurisdictions where intimate identity is a prosecutable condition. Those flows are real. They are documented. They are the defining feature of this domain. They are not measurable in the units the formula uses. That is not a failure of the formula. It is the formula reaching the outer boundary of what market-based measurement can capture. The series has documented, paper by paper, the full range of what participation value is worth in commercial systems. This paper establishes where that range ends and a different class of consequence begins.
The connection objection holds that dating platforms enable genuine human connection, LGBTQ+ platforms provide community for people who lack it in their physical environment, and adult content platforms provide economic opportunity and creative expression for participants who choose them. Each of these claims is accurate. None address the misclassification argument. The question the PDR framework asks is not whether intimate participation platforms deliver value to their users. It is whether the person is recognized as the origin of the intimate identity data their participation generates and whether they have standing in the systems that data enters once it leaves the platform. A person who found a genuine relationship through a dating application received real value. They simultaneously generated a behavioral record of intimate psychology that the platform assembled into a commercial asset without recognition of their contribution. The value they received and the misclassification they experienced are simultaneous features of the same transaction.
The consent objection holds that users voluntarily disclosed intimate information, agreed to terms of service, and therefore authorized the commercial and non-commercial flows this paper documents. The consent objection fails on the same grounds it has failed across the series, with a specific observation for this domain. Voluntary disclosure in a context understood to be private and bounded does not constitute consent to data flows that exit the platform through advertising SDK infrastructure and reach parties operating in legal environments the participant had no reason to anticipate at the point of disclosure. The terms of service the participant agreed to were written to satisfy legal disclosure requirements in the platform's jurisdiction of incorporation. They were not written to inform a participant in a jurisdiction where their identity is criminalized about the movement of that identity through data broker systems to parties whose interests are not commercial.
The safety objection holds that LGBTQ+ platforms exist because physical spaces are unsafe for the communities they serve, and that the platform provides a safer environment for connection and community formation than the physical alternatives. This objection correctly identifies the social function of these platforms and the genuine safety value they provide to their participants. It does not address the structural condition this paper documents: the platform that provides a safer environment for connection also creates a dataset of identity, location, and intimate behavior whose exposure through the standard advertising data infrastructure can produce consequences more severe than those the participant was seeking safety from. The safety the platform provides is real. The exposure the platform's data architecture creates is also real. They are not mutually exclusive. They are simultaneous properties of the same system.
The intimate participation domain faces regulatory exposure across several frameworks, organized here from the most specific documented action to the broadest emerging legislative direction.
The Norwegian Data Protection Authority's determination against Grindr, resulting in a fine ultimately settled at 6.5 million Norwegian krone following appeal, established on the regulatory record that intimate identity data including sexual orientation constitutes special category data under GDPR requiring explicit consent for processing and that transmission of that data to advertising partners without valid legal basis constitutes a violation of that requirement. The action represents the most specific available regulatory determination that intimate identity data in the advertising technology ecosystem received inadequate legal protection.
The CFIUS divestiture order requiring Beijing Kunlun Tech to sell its Grindr ownership stake established on the national security record that intimate platform participation data constitutes a strategic asset whose foreign ownership creates unacceptable risk to United States national security. The order is the only instance in this series where participation data has been classified as a national security concern by the United States government.
The Federal Trade Commission has conducted investigations into dating platform data practices, with particular attention to the disclosure and use of intimate behavioral data for advertising targeting purposes. The FTC's enforcement posture in the intimate data domain follows its general authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to address unfair or deceptive data practices, applied to the specific context of sensitive personal information.
State non-consensual intimate image laws, enacted in the majority of American states, address the distribution of intimate content without consent. These frameworks address one dimension of the permanence problem documented in Section Five. They do not address the participation value misclassification that precedes the distribution or the data flows documented in Section Three.
Post-Dobbs state laws criminalizing abortion-related conduct interact with intimate platform data retention in the manner documented in Paper Eight and noted here for completeness. Reproductive health disclosures made within intimate platform environments carry the same legal exposure in those jurisdictions as the wellness platform disclosures documented in the prior paper.
The EU GDPR's classification of sexual orientation, gender identity, and health status as special category data requiring explicit consent for processing is the most comprehensive available regulatory framework for intimate participation data. Its enforcement in the Grindr case demonstrates its applicability. Its geographic scope limits its protection to participants in jurisdictions subject to GDPR. Participants in jurisdictions where their identity carries legal risk are not necessarily in jurisdictions where GDPR applies.
The PDR calculation in this paper covers Match Group's disclosed revenue as the commercial baseline and documents Grindr's regulatory and national security valuations as boundary-condition evidence. It does not include the following participation categories. Their exclusion is methodological. Their exposure is real.
Relationship and couples therapy applications including Relish and similar platforms capture the content of intimate relationship dynamics, conflict patterns, and emotional vulnerability in a context whose sensitivity exceeds any other category in this section. The participant discloses not only their own intimate psychology but the intimate dynamics of their relationship and the behavior of a partner who may not have consented to platform participation at all.
Kink and fetish platforms whose participation data represents a category of intimate disclosure with acute exposure consequences in contexts beyond GDPR jurisdictions. The specificity of the behavioral signals generated through these platforms produces a participation record whose exposure risk is disproportionate to its commercial value.
Social platforms used primarily by LGBTQ+ communities in jurisdictions where that identity carries legal risk, including platforms not primarily designed for that purpose but used for community formation. The participation record generated through community engagement on mainstream social platforms by users whose participation pattern identifies them as members of a criminalized identity group represents an exposure risk that does not require an intimate platform. It requires only a pattern.
Asylum and immigration proceedings that interact with sexual orientation and gender identity data held by commercial platforms. An asylum applicant whose intimate platform participation history is subpoenaed as evidence of sexual orientation in a proceeding where that orientation is the basis of the asylum claim is in a legal environment where their intimate participation data is simultaneously their protection and their exposure.
Employer background check systems that incorporate social media and platform participation data in ways that can surface intimate identity disclosures made in contexts the participant understood to be separate from employment relationships.
The floor is not the number. In this domain the floor is not the number and the number is not the harm.
Every prior paper in this series documented a system that extracts value from participation and produces a measurable consequence in commercial systems. Paper Seven showed that the system can charge the participant using their own data. Paper Eight showed that the system can hold and transfer what the participant is. Paper Nine shows that the system can expose the participant to consequences that commercial systems cannot contain and the market cannot price.
The person whose location and intimate identity data left Grindr through the advertising SDK infrastructure did not experience a pricing harm or an asset transfer. They experienced exposure: the movement of their identity through systems that do not recognize them as its origin, into environments that may treat that identity as a liability, a threat, or a crime. That exposure did not require a sale. It did not require a platform decision directed at them. It required only that the data exist and that the pipe flow.
The misclassification this series documents reaches a boundary in this paper. The PDR formula measures what participation is worth in commercial systems. In this domain, the most consequential flows do not pass through commercial systems. The series has now documented, paper by paper, the full range of commercial participation value. This paper establishes where that range ends and a different class of consequence begins: one where the participant is not uncompensated. They are unsafe.
Running total after Paper Nine. Add only the lines that apply to you.
If you use a wearable device or health platform — See Paper Eight ledger entry.
If you use dating or intimate platforms
Match Group per-user revenue baseline: approximately $3.49 billion in fiscal year 2024 revenue divided across the active user base. The per-user commercial baseline follows the series method and represents subscription and advertising revenue only. It does not capture the value of the intimate behavioral record generated alongside those transactions.
Grindr and equivalent platforms: not calculable in the units the formula uses. The most consequential flows from intimate platform participation do not pass through commercial systems. This is the first domain in the series where participation value cannot be expressed purely in monetary terms. The ledger records this as a boundary condition, not a gap in the data.
This is the first ledger entry in the series where the relevant harm is not financial. The floor established in prior papers measures what platforms realize from participation. In this domain the floor is not the number and the number is not the harm.Match Group, Inc., Annual Report on Form 10-K, fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, February 2025.
SINTEF, Grindr data sharing research documentation, 2018. sintef.no.
Norwegian Consumer Council, Out of Control: How Consumers Are Exploited by the Online Advertising Industry, January 2020. forbrukerradet.no.
Norwegian Data Protection Authority, determination and fine against Grindr LLC, 2021. Final reduced penalty 6.5 million Norwegian krone following appeal proceedings. datatilsynet.no.
United States Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, divestiture order requiring Beijing Kunlun Tech Co. Ltd. to divest ownership of Grindr LLC, 2019 to 2020. treasury.gov.
OnlyFans, financial disclosures for fiscal year ended November 2023. Gross merchandise value approximately $6.6 billion confirmed from company statements.
Federal Trade Commission, investigations into dating platform data practices. ftc.gov.
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 2022. Referenced for post-Dobbs reproductive health data legal environment, consistent with Paper Eight citation.
Washington State Legislature, My Health MY Data Act, Chapter 70.372 RCW, enacted April 2023. Referenced for reproductive health data protection framework.
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation 2016/679, Article 9, special categories of personal data including sexual orientation and health status.
Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra, Leonard Goff, Diego Jiménez-Hernández, Jaron Lanier, and E. Glen Weyl, Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving beyond Free, AEA Papers and Proceedings 108, 2018, pp. 38–42.
Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society, Princeton University Press, 2018.
Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, PublicAffairs, 2019.